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Respondent State ofIdaho makes a number of procedural and substantive objections that
are either without merit, any significant effect, or are cured and addressed herein.
1. Procedural Objections Are Without Merit

A.

Record and Citation Issues

The State makes several accusations of insufficient citations and an inadequate record.
Brief of Respondent at 9-10, hereinafter "Res. Brief." With respect to Fields's citation to the
prior trial, post-conviction and appellate records, Fields has asked this Court to take judicial notice
of the prior records. See Motion to Take Judicial Notice, filed in this Court, Jan. 20, 2012. The
State consented to judicial notice of the same materials in the district court, R. 106, and the court
below plainly took judicial notice ofthe underlying record: it explicitly documented its review of
the trial transcript and motion for new trial in its opinion. R. 190 & n.1. See also R. 191
(indicating review of underlying trial record in discussirigjury's access to the coat). Further, the
State has the record from the prior proceedings, responded in its brief to the prior proceeding
citations and arguments by Fields in his opening brief, and cited the various provisions of the prior
records more than 50 times therein. There is no prejudice to the State, and this Court should
simply grant the motion for judicial notice.
The State contends that Fields did not cite to the record testimony of various witnesses and
counsel's closing argument. Res. Brief at 32 (citing Opening Brief at 16-17). Record citations at
that section of the Opening Hrief would have been repetitive. Fields provided extensive citations
only a few pages before. See Opening Brief at 9-10. The relevant portion of the closing
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argument was noted, Opening Brief at 16, but not explicitly cited. That portion of the defense's
closing argument appears on page 1676 of the trial transcript. T. Tr. Vol. 8, p. 1676.
The State also contends that Fields did not raise Eighth Amendment and state due process
arguments relating to the destruction ofthe coat in his petition. Res. Brief at 34-35. Fields
concedes he did not raise the Eighth Amendment claim below. However, he did raise the due
process claim in briefing to the district court in support of his petition. R. 180-81 (citing Id.
Const., Art. I, § 13).

B. The Petition Was Timely
Notwithstanding the district court's finding to the contrary, R. 189, the State contends that
Fields's petition was untimely. Res. Brief at 13-17. In fact, Fields filed suit within 42 days of
discovering the shocking news that the State had destroyed a court exhibit -- contrary to a direct
court order. See R. 82 (discovery of coat's destruction on Aug. 31, 2011); R. 10 (petition filed
Oct. 12,2010).
In contending that Fields bore the burden to physically document and copy court exhibits,
which are required to be preserved and kept for the duration of a capitally sentenced inmate's life
pursuant to court rule and sound policy, the State relies on a peculiar view of diligence that
absolves the State of its own wrong-doing. The State overlooks its own illegal destruction of
Fields's coat as the cause of the lost evidence. Instead, the State wrongly seeks to escape blame
by making all unwarranted allegation that Fields "should have known" ofthe coat's destruction
earlier.
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In arguing that Fields bears the blame for not discovering the State's destruction sooner,
the State alleges that Fields should have argued his motion for independent testing of the coat
rather than abandon it. Res. Briefat 13-16. The State accuses Fields of trying to "have it both
ways," in arguing that he was still seeking testing of the coat at the time the coat was destroyed, but
that he did not pursue testing after getting the State's concessions. Res. Brief at 22.
However, the coat was destroyed in 2004, and Judge Neville only granted Fields access to
the evidence in 2006. DNA PCR R. 154, #36508, cited in, Res. Brief atl6. Since filing the DNA
petition in 2002, Fields had been arguing for access to all of the evidence to see what was available
for testing. Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing, DNA PCR R. 11, #36508. It made
little sense to notice for hearing the motion for testing on the coat, without first finding out what
other evidence might be available for testing and more worthy of the effort and expense. The
State had conceded that the jury could not have relied upon any forensic evidence regarding the
coat.

E.g., R. 63 (State's Response to Motion for Independent Scientific Testing in the DNA

PCR R. 82, #36508, filed Oct. 28, 2003) ("The jury was never given reason to believe that the
sample was the victim's blood to begin with.").
The district court properly found that it was reasonable for Fields to forego testing the coat.
Originally, the State presented equivocal testimony from which a fact-finder might infer that
human blood was present on Fields's coat. After the State explicitly conceded that the jury had no
basis to believe the coat had the victim's blood on it, the testing originally sought was moot. R.
189. See R. 63. Once Fields was granted access to the evidence held by the State, he discovered
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hairs and fingernail scrapings taken from the victim. These were far more significant to his
innocence claim.
It was perfectly reasonable for Fields to forego expensive DNA testing on a coat that

concededly never had any forensic evidence of importance. It was equally reasonable for Fields
to rely on a court order that the coat be preserved and returned to the court. It was also reasonable
for Fields to presume that the prosecution and police would obey that order. "Ordinarily, we
presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties." Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668, 696 (2004) (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,909 (1997» (Internal quotation
marks omitted). The State's attempt to hold Fields responsible for its own misconduct is an
extraordinary instance of unclean hands that ought not be countenanced. The district court was
correct to find the petition was timely filed within 42 days of Fields's discovery ofthe coat's
destruction.
C.

Fields Cited the Post-Conviction Statute, Which Governs Availability of Relief

The State also alleges that Fields has not stated the legal grounds for the relief he seeks.
Res. Brief at 17-18. The State's contention that Fields has not made clear the basis for his claims
cannot withstand scrutiny.
In his post-conviction petition, Fields plainly stated the basis for relief, which
unsurprisingly is the post-conviction relief statute. See Petition, R. 10 (citing I.e. §§ 19-2719,
19-4901, 19-4902). He stated that the newly discovered evidence of the coat's destruction
entitled him to relief. R. 17. The district court dismissed this case under I.e. § 19-2719(5)(b).
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In his opening brief, Fields repeatedly cited the pertinent statutory language,

I.e. §

19-2719, that allows a petitioner to proceed in the successive post-conviction context in a capital
case, i.e., assuming a timely successive petition, whether the petition casts doubt on the reliability
ofthe conviction. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, 8, 12, 15. Fields likewise cited the pertinent
statutory provision,

I.e. § 19-2719, to avoid summary dismissal, Appellant's Opening Brief at 15.

His petition for post-conviction relief, itself, cited not only § 19-2719, but also §§ 19-4901 and

4902. Id. at 2.
Fields cited Detective Smith's misconduct as "substantive" evidence of Smith's efforts to
"make and preserve the conviction through illegal means" that "casts doubt on the reliability of
Fields' conviction," and is "not merely cumulative or impeaching" evidence. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 7-8. Fields noted that Detective Smith's "tampering" with evidence "'is
sufficient to undermine the outcome of the trial.'"

!d. at12 (quoting Grube v. Blades, No.

CV-01-357-S-BLW, 2006 WL 297203, at *21 (D. Idaho Feb. 6, 2006) (Winmill, J.)). Based on
all the new evidence, a new jury would likely acquit Fields. Id. at 12. All ofthe "new evidence"
-- including DNA which does not match fields, inmates making up their stories, and Smith's
various instances oftampering with evidence and witnesses -- gave rise to a reasonable probability
of a different result, a likely acquittal, and casts doubt on the reliability of the conviction.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, 15. The likelihood of an acquittal is the standard method for
evaluating whether a new trial should be granted based on newly discovered evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972,978 (Idaho 1976).
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Newly discovered evidence such as Detective Smith's destruction of the coat constitutes
"material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice." I.e. § 19-4901 (a)(4). The district court below dismissed
Fields's petition without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to I.e. § 19-2719(5)(b). R.194.
Respondent acknowledges that Fields bore the "burden of casting doubt on the reliability of the
conviction," Res. Brief at 21, and Fields cited that standard and § 19-2719(5)(b). Fields was
entitled to prove his claim that he is innocent in light of all the evidence, including the new
evidence. The new evidence casts doubt on the reliability of his conviction, and establishes that
his conviction should be vacated "in the interest of justice."
That Fields did not expressly cite § 19-4901 in his Opening Brief as the underlying
authority for the petition does not create a basis for arguing he did not cite proper authority for
obtaining relief in this court. First, Fields cited the petition itself, which cited §19-4901(a) as its
underlying authority. More significantly, his petition was dismissed based on a failure to meet
the requirements of § 19-2719(5)(b), not § 19-4901. Fields properly argued § 19-2719(5)(b) as
the authority controlling this appeal, when he argued that the dismissal of his petition under that
provision was error.
2.

Detective Smith's Destruction of the Coat is a Basis for Post-Conviction Relief
A.

The State's Concession that the Coat had No Inside Pockets

The State concedes that Defense Trial Exhibit 22, the destroyed coat that belonged to
Fields, did not have pockets on the inside. Res. Brief at 34. This concession ameliorates much
ofthe prejudice from the coat's destruction. The inability to prove "no pockets on the inside"
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after the coat was destroyed was the basis for the due process violation Fields alleged in Count II of
the petition. Given the State's concession, this Court does not need to physically examine the
coat to know conclusively that it had no pockets on the inside. Should Fields win a re-trial, with
this concession in hand, he can inform the jury that the camouflage coat which Keith Edson claims
he saw Fields wearing at the Wishing Well, Defense Exhibit 22, did not have pockets on the inside.
With this concession, the prejudice from the destruction of the coat is substantially
diminished. Pictures in the record imperfectly but adequately convey the destroyed coat's bright
camouflage pattern. R. 165-172 (attaching color copies of Trial Exhibits 18,38,39 and 40); R.
Exhibits Ex. 3 pp. 6-7 (attaching color copy of Trial Exhibit 18). The State's concession that the
destroyed coat did not have inside pockets resolves the due process claim relating to the loss of
Defense Exhibit 22.
B. The Destroyed Coat's Materiality to the Question of Innocence and the Lack of
Confidence any Court Can have in the Conviction
The State's concession does not resolve the question of Detective Smith's bad faith or
whether in light of this new evidence Fields would still have been convicted. Fields was never
given a hearing or the opportunity for cross-examination of Detective Smith. The district court
avoided deciding the issue of bad faith, because it concluded that the coat was not material
evidence and that Fields was not prejudiced by its destruction. R. 194. Fields contends that
Detective Smith's bad faith destruction of the coat is a material fact that goes to the issue of
whether Fields is innocent, I.C. § 19-4901 (4) and (6), whether his conviction is reliable, I.C. §
19-2719( 5), and whether his conviction should be vacated "in the interest of justice," I.C. §

-10-

19-4901(4). All of these issues are relevant to Count I, a general claim for post-conviction relief
on the ground that Fields is innocent and would likely be acquitted at a new trial.
The coat's destruction is material for two reasons. First, it documents additional evidence
tampering by Detective Smith. Fields has consistently denied confessing to the inmate snitches
and alleged that Detective Smith inappropriately conveyed information about the case to the
inmate snitches who testified against Fields. See generally Opening Brief at 8, 13-15 (citing
Acheson's Affidavit that Smith fed him information, Salvador Martinez's testimony that Smith fed
information to the inmates, and inmates' admissions that they cooked up their stories). Added to
this information, Detective Smith's destruction of the coat is additional evidence of improper
conduct aimed at maintaining Fields's conviction. This additional misbehavior makes the prior
misconduct allegations more believable, i.e. that he fed witnesses information they didn't have.
His destruction ofthe coat is not cumulative evidence, because it is substantially different in kind,
but it is substantively relevant and helps the Court (and a jury at re-trial) understand the misguided
or corrupt lead detective's single-minded efforts to obtain and preserve Fields's conviction.
Fields should have been granted the opportunity for discovery and a hearing at which he could
subject Detective Smith to the crucible of cross-examination.
The destroyed coat was also material because it complicated the State's theory and
required that Fields would have had to carry and wear three coats in the course of the robbery.
Edson described Fields as wearing a bright, multi-colored camouflage coat, Defense Exhibit 22,
when Fields allegedly entered the Wishing Well store. T. Tr. Vol. 6, pp. 1208, 1218, 1224.
However, Betty Homecker-Heaton described a solid, navy blue, hooded sweatshirt on the man
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who carne in the store. See R. Exhibits, Ex. 1, pp. 2-3; T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 954-55.
Homecker-Heaton saw the man enter the store, T. Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 928-29,948, and she did not see
the camouflage coat that Edson alleged Fields wore into the store a few minutes after 11 a.m. T.
Tr. Vol. 5, p. 965. The Linda Vista Plaza witnesses describe a third coat, a puffy, solid, orange or
red coat and they unanimously agreed that it was not the camouflage coat that Edson claimed to
have seen on Fields. See generally Opening Brief at 9-10.
In light of all the evidence in this case, particularly Detective Smith's feeding of critical
information to inmate witnesses, his destruction of the defense exhibit - - at a time Fields was
seeking DNA testing of it - - is further substantive evidence of Detective Smith's intent to obtain
and preserve a conviction without regard to rules or justice.
Smith's destruction of the coat is not merely cumulative evidence, as the State argues.
Res. Briefat 20-21. Fields first raised Detective Smith's illegal conduct to the courts through
Salvador Martinez. Mr. Martinez's testimony stood alone and the district court found him not
credible. T. R., #16259, p. 145. Since then, however, several additional instances of Detective
Smith's mis-conduct have been uncovered. Detective Smith told Jeff Acheson that the murder
weapon was a knife not a gun. R.44. And, in this case, Detective Smith, an experienced
detective who should have known better, violated a court order and destroyed court evidence in a
capital case. In the district court, below, in a new case, the first of the inmate witnesses to corne
forward, Harold Gilcrist, has recanted. He alleges that Detective Smith gave him information
about the crime and showed him the Fields file. The facts calling into question the propriety of
Detective Smith's handling of the investigation are important factual matters that undermine
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confidence in the verdict. I.e.§ 19-2719(5). This is particularly true, given that Fields has
discovered that DNA under the victim's fingernails is from another man, not Fields, and the trial
evidence showed that the victim had a defensive wound on her hand. Moreover, two women
observed a larger, much older, bald man who was not Fields, who remained alone in the store with
the victim when the last woman left the store about a minute before the murder. See generally
Opening Brief at 8-9,11-14.
If presented to a jury, this evidence would likely result in an acquittal. This Court should
therefore reverse the district court and remand with instructions to allow discovery and an
evidentiary hearing. After an opportunity for cross-examination, if Fields can establish the facts
he has alleged regarding Detective Smith's misconduct, Fields's conviction should be vacated in
the interest of justice.
3. Fields Timely Raised a Newly Discovered Evidence Claim and Does Not Rely on An
Actual Innocence Exception to the Post-Conviction Relief Act

As set forth supra at 5, Fields timely filed his petition within 42 days of discovering the
destruction ofthe coat. The State contends that that Fields failed to provide a statutory basis for
his innocence claim, because none exists in Idaho. Res. Brief at 18. The State purposely
mis-reads this claim. Fields argued that the statutory basis for relief is simply the post-conviction
statute, I.e. §§ 19-2719, 19-4901 and 19-4902. He maintains that position before this Court. In
Fields's prior DNA case, this Court held that House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), and Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), are inapplicable to Idaho's state post-conviction proceedings. Fields
v. State, 151 Idaho 18, _, 253 P .3d 692, 695-96 (Idaho 2011). This Court also declined to
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consider all of the evidence Fields submitted under House and Schlup, because those federal cases
are inapplicable to state proceedings. !d. at 695-96, 698-700. However, this Court made clear
that post-conviction relief may be granted for newly discovered evidence, provided it is not
cumulative, impeaching or untimely. Id. at 699-700.
Here, Fields is relying on this Court's interpretation of the post conviction statute
announced in the DNA case. Fields has timely brought forward newly discovered evidence of the
detective's destruction of the coat. See supra, at 5. He has made clear that his claim is based on
the post-conviction relief statute, including I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4) (newly discovered evidence that
requires vacation of conviction or sentence). Unless this Court chooses to overrule its recent
Fields DNA opinion, the State's argument is misplaced. It is plain under the DNA case that

Fields's only avenue for relief in state court is through the newly discovered evidence provision of
the post-conviction statute. The "interest of justice" provision may be read to reach cases in
which an acquittal likely would result if the case were re-tried, and on that basis, Fields contends
he is entitled to post-conviction relief. In light of all the available evidence and not restricting
Fields's claim for relief to the destroyed coat alone, Fields has presented sufficient evidence to
undermine confidence in the reliability of his conviction. See I.C. § 19-2719(5)(b). The district
court's decision should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary
hearing.
4. Fields Does Not Seek Unnecessary Delay
Lastly, the State suggests that Fields's primary purpose in this litigation is to delay the
habeas proceedings in federal court. Res. Brief at 16-17. The State is wrong. As an innocent
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man, wrongly convicted and sentenced to death, Fields's purpose in bringing this action is to prove
that he is entitled to post-conviction relief.
With each new fact that comes to light, Fields has chipped away at the case the State
presented against him. He has sought to have the courts of this State review his claims, examine
the new facts, and look seriously at this case of an innocent man denied justice. The DNA results
reveal the presence of another man's DNA under the victim's fingernails, on a hand that also had a
defensive wound. Witnesses have come forward and revealed that the police's lead detective
provided information to the inmate snitches, who themselves provided the only evidence, alleged
"confessions," that led to Fields's conviction. Two women present at the scene until moments
before the crime occurred were disturbed by the man who was present and remained behind, alone
with the victim, a man they say was not Fields.
Fields now comes to this Court with undisputed evidence that the lead detective destroyed
a coat that was an exculpatory defense exhibit, contrary to court order, and notwithstanding a
pending request by defense counsel to conduct DNA testing on it. Fields comes to this Court not
to delay proceedings in federal court, but seeking post-conviction relief, and ultimately, a new trial
at which he can establish his innocence based on all the evidence.
5. Conclusion

This Court should reverse the district court and remand the case with instructions to grant
Fields an evidentiary hearing on his claims.
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Respectfully submitted this 9th day of February, 2012.
Samuel Richard Rubin
Federal Public Defender

esa A. Hampton
orneys for Appellant
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